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CASES NOTED
RECOVERY FOR THE LOSS OF USE OF A
PLEASURE VEHICLE
Subsequent to an automobile accident for which the defendant
admitted liability, the plaintiff was deprived of the use of her car for
fourteen days while the vehicle was being repaired. Unrefuted testimony
was given by a representative of a rental car agency regarding the cost
to rent a car comparable to the one which was damaged. Although a
substitute vehicle was not rented, nor any expense incurred for trans-
portation during the period of necessary repairs, and even though the
car was used primarily for pleasure with no real commercial purpose,
the trial court awarded damages to the plaintiff for her loss of pleasure-
use in an amount approximating the rental value of a substitute vehicle.
On appeal to the District Court of Appeal, Second District, held, affirmed:
Even though no substitute was hired, compensation is to be awarded
for the reasonable value of the loss of use of a pleasure vehicle during
the period of repairs, with the rental value of a substitute car being
indicative of the loss-of-use value and not necessarily the conclusive
measure of the damage. Meakin v. Dreier, 209 So.2d 252 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1968).
In an evolutionary manner, a wide majority of jurisdictions have
concluded that damages for the loss of use of an automobile may be
allowed against one who negligently injured it, with the recovery for
loss of use not limited solely to those cases in which the vehicle was
used for commercial purposes.1 The general trend today is that such
damages may be awarded to the owner of a pleasure vehicle notwith-
standing his failure to hire another vehicle to temporarily replace the
damaged car.2 Although damages for loss of use have previously been
awarded in Florida,3 the instant case is the first reported decision in
which a Florida court has granted damages for the loss of use of a
pleasure vehicle.4
Initial awards of damages for deprivations of use were concerned
with the reimbursement of pecuniary loss suffered as a result of tortious
1. There are 27 states in which courts have held this way: Alabama, California, Connec-
ticut, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsyl-
vania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Washington and Wyoming. See Harris
v. Keller, 84 Ohio L. Abs. 45, 170 N.E.2d 305 (Springfield Mun. Ct. 1960).
2. Cook v. Packard Motor Co., 88 Conn. 590, 92 A. 413 (1914).
Dettmar v. Burns Bros., 111 Misc. 189, 181 N.Y.S. 146 (Sup. Ct. 1920). See also Malin-
son v. Black, 83 Cal. App. 2d 375, 188 P.2d 788 (1948) ; Pittari v. Madison Ave. Coach Co.,
188 Misc. 614, 68 N.Y.S.2d 741 (N.Y. City Ct. 1947) ; Scott v. Southern Ry., 231 S.C. 28, 97
S.E.2d 73 (1957) ; Holmes v. Raffo, 60 Wash. 2d 421, 374 P.2d 536 (1962).
3. A. Mortellaro & Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 91 Fla. 230, 107 So. 528 (1926)
Wajay Bakery, Inc. v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 177 So.2d 544 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
See also Allen v. Hooper, 126 Fla. 458, 171 So. 513 (1936).
4. 209 So.2d at 253.
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injury to commercial vehicles.' Historically, throughout the country
such awards go as far back as horse-and-buggy days.' Almost all juris-
dictions have at least recognized a right to recover for the loss of service
of a commercial vehicle.7 Moreover, the period of time qualifying as
a basis for recovery is the period of deprivation during which the owner
was necessarily deprived of the vehicle while it was actually undergoing
repairs or could have been repaired with ordinary diligence.8 The reason-
ableness of the time consumed in making repairs is generally a matter
largely dependent upon the circumstances of the case. Although it has
been widely accepted in almost all jurisdictions that loss-of-use damages
may be collected when the period of deprivation results in a pecuniary
loss, compensation for this type of damage has not been so easily obtain-
able in the past when pleasure vehicles were involved.
However, damages should have been awarded in such cases, for
once it has been established that a person is liable in fact for an accident,
that person may be held responsible for all the consequences that reason-
ably and naturally flow from his wrongful act.9 The Restatement of
Torts provides for compensation for the reasonable value of the loss of
use of a pleasure vehicle during the time of repairs.10 The soundness of
the rule is reflected in its acceptance by an overwhelming number of
jurisdictions."
An important issue in the instant case was whether or not damages
could be collected for loss of use when no substitute car had in fact
been rented. There is a difference in opinion whether damages for loss
of use can be collected in this situation. 2 Substantial authority holds
that the use value may be recovered regardless of whether another
vehicle was actually hired during the repair interval." This is the view of
the Restatement 4 and represents the present trend in most jurisdictions.' 5
5. See Allen v. Hooper, 126 Fla. 458, 171 So. 513 (1936) ; A. Mortellaro & Co. v. Atlantic
Coast Line R.R., 91 Fla. 230, 107 So. 528 (1926).
6. Brown v. Southbury, 53 Conn. 212, 1 A. 819 (1885) ; Shelbyville Lateral Branch R.R.
v. Lewark, 4 Ind. 471 (1853) ; Monroe v. Lattin, 25 Kan. 351 (1881) ; Johnson v. Holyoke,
105 Mass. 80 (1870) ; Wheeler v. Townshend, 42 Vt. 15 (1869).
7. Arkansas is the only exception. See Kane v. Carper-Dover Mercantile Co., 206 Ark.
674, 177 S.W.2d 41 (1944).
8. Cook v. Packard Motor Car Co., 88 Conn. 590, 92 A. 413 (1914) ; Allen v. Hooper,
126 Fla. 458, 171 So. 513 (1936).
9. Hanna v. Martin, 49 So.2d 585 (Fla. 1950).
10. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 931, illustration 2 at 672 (A.L.I. 1939).
11. See the states cited note 1 supra.
12. Alabama and Louisiana require that a substitute vehicle must have actually been
rented in order for the plaintiff to collect damages for the loss of the use of his car. See Bates
v. General Steel Tank Co., 36 Ala. App. 261, 55 So.2d 213 (1951) ; Goode v. Hantz, 209 La.
821, 25 So.2d 604 (1946). Early New York cases also so held. But see Dettmar v. Burns Bros.,
Il1 Misc. 189, 181 N.Y.S. 146 (Sup. Ct. 1920).
13. Myers v. Bradford, 54 Cal. App. 157, 201 P. 471 (1921) ; Cook v. Packard Motor Car
Co., 88 Conn. 590, 92 A. 413 (1914) ; Pittari v. Madison Ave. Coach Co., 188 Misc. 614, 68
N.Y.S.2d 741 (N.Y. City Ct. 1947); Perry v. Harris, 95 Ohio L. Abs. 21, 197 N.E.2d 416
(1964) ; Scott v. Southern Ry., 231 S.C. 28, 97 S.E.2d 73 (1957) ; e.g., Holmes v. Raffo, 60
Wash. 2d 421, 374 P.2d 536 (1962).
14. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 931, illustration 2, at 672 (A.L.I. 1939).
15. See Cook v. Packard Motor Car Co., 88 Conn. 590, 92 A. 413 (1914); Dettmar v.
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The language used by the Florida courts in the past has been rather
obscure regarding this issue. In A. Mortellaro & Co. v. Atlantic Coast
Line R.R. the court stated that the amount necessary for the plaintiff
to expend to temporarily replace a truck would be recoverable. However,
the court did not say that such an amount had to be actually expended.16
Nevertheless, the instant case very distinctly places Florida with the
majority in not requiring that a substitute vehicle actually be rented
before an owner can collect damages for the loss of use of his car.17
A few jurisdictions do maintain that a replacement vehicle must
have been hired as a prerequisite for recovery, or else evidence must
be shown that a reasonable effort was made to procure a substitute.'
8
Frequently, where recovery is contingent upon the plaintiff's actually
renting a replacement, the requirement is closely allied with the problem
of finding a proper and adequate measure of the damages for the loss
of use. A court in such an instance usually reasons that if other vehicles
of a like kind are available, then the cost of the rental of the replacement
vehicle is a good means of determining the amount of damages. 9 However,
this rationale has been rejected by the majority of jurisdictions where
it has been held that the rental value of a substitute vehicle should only
be indicative of the loss-of-use value and not conclusive evidence of the
amount of the damage.2" The Restatement, however, goes so far as to
indicate that the injured party should collect "at least" the rental value
of a substitute car whether a replacement is actually rented or not.
21
There is substantial authority contrary to the Restatement on this point.
Several jurisdictions maintain that the amount of damages to be awarded
for loss of use should be less than the entire rental price of a substitute
vehicle.22 Cook v. Packard Motor Car Co.21 is the leading case in which the
court reasoned that the rental value of a substitute car was not the
conclusive measure of damages for loss of use because this amount
Burns Bros., 111 Misc. 189, 181 N.Y.S. 146 (Sup. Ct. 1920); Holmes v. Raffo, 60 Wash. 2d
421, 374 P.2d 536 (1962).
16. 91 Fla. 230, 232, 107 So. 528, 530 (1926).
17. 209 So.2d at 254.
18. See Bates v. General Steel Tank Co., 36 Ala. App. 261, 55 So.2d 213 (1951) ; Carkuff
v. Geophysical Service, 179 So. 490 (La. App. 1938); Conley v. Kansas City R.R., 259 S.W.
153 (Mo. App. 1921); Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Feldkamp, 19 Ohio App. 421 (1924).
19. See Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Elk Refining Co., 186 F.2d 30 (1950); Meyers v.
Bradford, 54 Cal. App. 157, 201 P. 471 (1921); Perry v. Harris, 95 Ohio L. Abs. 21, 197
N.E.2d 416 (Mun. Ct. 1964); Somerville v. Dellosa, 133 W. Va. 435, 56 S.E.2d 756 (1949).
20. Consolidated Nat'l Bank v. Cunningham, 28 Ariz. 518, 238 P. 332 (1925) ; Anderson
v. Gengras Motors, Inc., 141 Conn. 688, 109 A.2d 502 (1954) ; Cook v. Packard Motor Co.,
88 Conn. 590, 92 A. 413 (1914) ; Lonnecker v. Van Patten, 179 N.W. 432 (Iowa 1920). See
Larson Bros. Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Kansas City, 115 Kan. 589, 224 P. 47 (1924) ; Dahl-
strom Metallic Door Co. v. Evatt Constr. Co., 256 Mass. 404, 152 N.E. 715 (1926) ; e.g.,
Perkins v. Brown, 132 Tenn. 294, 177 S.W. 1158 (1915).
21. "The owner of the subject matter is entitled to recover as damages for the loss of the
value of the use, at least the rental value of the chattel .... " RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 931,
Comment (b) at 671 (1939).
22. See cases cited note 20 supra.
23. 88 Conn. 590,92 A. 413 (1914).
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would include a substantial allowance for depreciation, repairs, overhead
expenses and profits of carrying on the business of renting cars.24
In considering the measure employed in awarding damages in the
instant case, it is important to note that although the award of damages
for loss of use coincided with the amount of the rental value of a sub-
stitute vehicle, the court followed the general rule and stated that the
rental value was to be regarded as highly relevant evidence. Such rental
value, however, was not necessarily the conclusive measure of the dam-
ages; it was only indicative of the loss-of-use value.2" The concurrence
of the rental value and the amount of the damages awarded appears
to be due to the fact there was unrebutted testimony by an unimpeached
witness supporting the plaintiff's claim that the rental value of a sub-
stitute vehicle represented the value of the loss of use to the plaintiff.26
The defendant's unsupported objection was overruled,27 and the de-
fendant offered no evidence to refute the claim, 28 resulting in an award
of damages approximating the rental price of a substitute vehicle. Florida
may yet follow the Cook case in allowing an amount to be deducted
from the rental price of a substitute vehicle for maintenance, deprecia-
tion, and the lessor's profit to arrive at a net value to the plaintiff of the
loss of the use of his car.
A problem which usually arises in this type of case is the extent to
which a court can go in awarding damages for loss of use. The greater
weight of authority is that a total award of damages composed of the
loss-of-use value plus the cost of repairs to the injured vehicle cannot
exceed the value of the vehicle before the accident.' Nevertheless, there
is some authority allowing recovery for deprivation during repairs, even
though this combined with the amount allowed for a depreciation of
value exceeds the reasonable market value of the vehicle before the
injury.30
Two jurisdictions3' maintain that the loss of the use of a pleasure
vehicle damaged in an accident is not a proper element of damages,
nor is there an effective basis for measuring such damage. The loss of
use of an automobile pending repair is not a proper element of damages
in Arkansas regardless of whether the vehicle is used for pleasure or
24. Id. at 592, 92 A. at 415.
25. 209 So.2d at 254.
26. Brief for Appellee at 5, Meakin v. Dreier, 209 So.2d 252 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
27. 209 So.2d at 255.
28. Brief for Appellee at 5, Meakin v. Dreier, 209 So.2d 252 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
29. Globe Motors, Inc. v. Noonan, 106 Ga. App. 486, 127 S.E.2d 320 (1962); Harlan v.
Passot, - Iowa -, 150 N.W.2d 87 (1967); Lester v. Doyle, 165 Kan. 354, 194 P.2d 917
(1948) ; e.g., Harris v. Keller, 84 Ohio L. Abs. 45, 170 N.E.2d 305 (Springfield Mun. Ct. 1960).
30. Anderson v. Gengras Motors, Inc., 141 Conn. 688, 109 A.2d 502 (1954); Cook v.
Packard Motor Car Co., 88 Conn. 590, 92 A. 413 (1914) ; Cook v. Southern Farm Bureau
Cas. Ins. Co., 124 So.2d 183 (La. App. 1960); Kopischke v. Chicago, St. P.M. & O.R.R., 230
Minn. 23, 40 N.W.2d 834 (1950).
31. Arkansas and Colorado do not allow recovery of damages for the loss of use of a
pleasure vehicle.
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for commercial purposes." Although allowing damages to be collected
for the loss of use of commercial vehicles, Colorado has held that dam-
ages for the loss of use of a pleasure vehicle are too speculative even to
be considered. 3 These courts do not acknowledge that the difficulty of
establishing a measure for these damages is certainly no greater than
attaching a price tag to pain and suffering in a personal injury case.
To be recoverable in Florida damages must be certain in both their
nature and in respect to the cause from which they proceed.34 There may
be a recovery for the loss of use of property provided that the use was
lawful, the deprived person was in a position to use the property, and
the damages are established with reasonable certainty and are not left
to speculation.35 It is sufficient if there is at least a reasonable basis of
computation. There is no strict requirement of 100% certainty. The rule
against contingent damages applies only to those damages which are
not the certain result of the wrong and not to those that are indeed
certain results, but are only uncertain in amount.3 6
The owner of a car has an investment in it, and this investment
gives him the right to use that car whenever and however he so chooses. 7
If that right is interrupted through no fault of his own, he should be
able to recover for the damage to his right caused by that interruption. 8
The fact that a vehicle may be used more often if used commercially
does not eliminate the fact that damage does exist at the moment of
interruption, even if the use is for pleasure only. 9
The fundamental principle of the law of damages is that the person
injured shall have a fair and just compensation commensurate with the
loss sustained in consequence of the defendant's tortious act.4 ' An inherent
value of ownership of property rests in the owner's right to use, enjoy
and convey the property at any time and in any way in which he deems
appropriate.4 ' This right to use and enjoy is in the manner of an
in rem right against all other persons that they should not invade
or interfere with one's use and enjoyment of a thing. The value of
the use of personal property is not the value of its intended use, but
32. Kane v. Carper-Dover Mercantile Co., 206 Ark. 674, 177 S.W.2d 41 (1944); Madison-
Smith Cadillac Co. v. Wallace, 181 Ark. 715, 27 S.W.2d 524 (1930).
33. Buchanan v. Leonard, 127 F. Supp. 120 (1954) (applying Colorado law) ; Hunter v.
Quaintance, 69 Colo. 28, 168 P. 918 (1917).
34. McCall v. Sherbil, 68 So.2d 362 (Fla. 1953).
35. Mahanna v. Westland Oil Co., 107 N.W.2d 353 (N.D. 1960).
36. McCall v. Sherbill, 68 So.2d 362 (Fla. 1953).
37. Harris v. Keller, 84 Ohio L. Abs. 45, 48, 170 N.E.2d 305, 307 (Springfield Mun. Ct.
1960).
38. The owner of a pleasure vehicle should be allowed to recover for the loss of the
enjoyment of his car, because the owner's ability to use his car has temporarily been lost;
hence, it is his right to use his car that has been damaged, and that loss is directly attributable
to the accident.
39. Harris v. Keller, 84 Ohio L. Abs. 45, 48, 170 N.E.2d 305, 307 (Springfield Xiqn, Ctt,
1960).
40. Hanna v. Martin, 49 So.2d 585 (Fla. 1950).
41. SEDGwIcK ON DAMACES § 243(a), at 493, 494 (9th ed. 1920).
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rather the value of its present use and availability to the owner." The
damage being compensated in an award for the loss of use is the present
usable value of the property to the plaintiff; therefore, it should make
no difference whether the owner uses his car for business or pleasure.
He should collect damages for the loss of use of either. 8
Although not at issue in the instant case, but certain to arise in
the future with an increased demand for loss-of-use damages, is the
question of whether such damages are in the nature of general damages
or special damages. There is authority going each way in other juris-
dictions. 4 It can be inferred from City of Alachua v. Swilley that dam-
ages for loss of service are in the nature of special damages in Florida
and must be specifically pleaded. 45 Loss of use is certainly a direct and
natural consequence of a substantial injury to a car; however, whether
that use is for pleasure or for commercial purposes could greatly affect
the amount of the damages. A claim for special damages is sufficient
if it notifies the defendant of the nature of the special damages claimed.4"
This writer agrees with the court in the result obtained in the
instant case. The court has applied the existing law47 with commendable
discretion and effected a clarification in the law which reaches toward
just compensation. In view of the staggering number of automobile
accidents each month in Florida, the instant case should soon be relied
upon frequently as more plaintiffs include a claim for the loss of use
of their pleasure vehicles.4 8
ROBERT A. FREEMAN
42. Id.
43. Cook v. Packard Motor Co., 88 Conn. 590, 592, 92 A. 413, 415 (1914) ; e.g., Holmes
v. Raffo, 60 Wash. 2d 421, 374 P.2d 536 (1962).
44. Asserting that such are special damages: Bates v. General Steel Tank Co., 36 Ala.
App. 261, 55 So.2d 213 (1951); Hunter v. Quaintance, 69 Colo. 28, 168 P. 918 (1917) (for
commercial vehicles only) ; Elliot v. Ticen, 78 Ind. App. 14, 134 N.E. 778 (1922) ; Herring
Motor Co. v. Myerly, 207 Iowa 990, 222 N.W. 1 (1928); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Hill, 307 Ky.
846, 212 S.W.2d 320 (Ct. App. 1948) ; Antokol v. Barber, 248 Mass. 393, 143 N.E. 350 (1924);
cf. Holmes v. Raffo, 60 Wash. 2d 421, 374 P.2d 536 (1962).
45. 118 So.2d 88 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1960). See FED. R. Cxv. P. 9(g) ; FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.120(g).
46. Augustine v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 So.2d 320 (Fla. 1956) ; Arcade Steam
Laundry v. Bass, 159 So.2d 915 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
47. 150 So.2d 465 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
48. Even though petition for certiorari has been filed, this writer is of the opinion that
it will be denied.
